Aggregation with Cournot competition: an empirical investigation

Bertrand Koebel and Francois Laisney

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the existence of Cournot equilibrium and the validity of the Le Chatelier-Samuelson (LCS) principle in the aggregate. Whereas two well known existence conditions are statistically rejected, we cannot reject a third, original, condition. We also find some empirical evidence for the LCS principle, as well as both increasing and constant returns to scale for two-digit US manufacturing industries. The results highlight the importance of imperfect competition for understanding aggregate growth, investment and employment.

Keywords: Aggregation; Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle; returns to scale; market power; markup; own-price elasticity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D24 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06-24
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Aggregation with Cournot Competition: An Empirical Investigation (2016)
Working Paper: Aggregation with Cournot Competition: An Empirical Investigation (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:72191

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