Competition in the Fixed Telecommunication Market Segment: Challenges and Theories

Inès Ben Dkhil

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The persistence of the market power in the fixed telecommunication markets in both developed and developing economies is due to the technical and economic features of this industry. This paper provides an overview of these characteristics and changes. It also suggests a comparative critical survey of the access pricing theories that are “the key” to the transition to the competition in the fixed telecommunication segment. Through this overview, we aim to underline among that the central role that the regulation should play to ensure the establishment of sustainable competition in the fixed telecommunication markets.

Keywords: Essential facilities; bottleneck; local loop; network externalities; economies of scale and scope; sunk costs; the marginal rule; the margin rule; the Ramsey pricing; the Price Caps policy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L43 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-pay and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72909/1/MPRA_paper_72909.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:72909

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().