Распределение прав собственности и максимизация коллективного благосостояния

An ownership allocation and collective welfare maximization

Georgiy Kolesnik

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The author considers economic systems with the property rights distributed among several agents. It is shown that outside interests of the owners make management strategies dependent on the property rights allocation. Unfavorable initial property rights allocation together with the barriers on their re-allocation leads to the inefficiency of the firms’ management.

Keywords: property rights; conflict of interests; welfare; efficiency; competition; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 D43 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12-05
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Published in Экономика и математические методы 2.48(2012): pp. 40-50

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Journal Article: Распределение прав собственности и максимизация коллективного благосостояния (2012)
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