An algorithmic approach to one-round electoral systems

José Manuel Gutiérrez and Wolfgang C. Müller

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A family of algorithms provides a formalization of how the basic one-round electoral systems – highest average and largest remainders, single transferable vote and single non-transferable vote systems – proceed in transforming votes into seats. In this way, the basic one-round electoral systems are parametrized with the four parameters n (size of the constituency), m (size of the nomination lists), ck (a factor providing the electoral formula) and l (signed election threshold). The parametrization reveals that the most important electoral systems have a common basic structure.

Keywords: electoral system; algorithm; parametrization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:73330

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