The corporate governance implications for China

Adam Karbowski

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The following paper applies agency theory to China’s current economic reform program. The financial and regulatory structures necessary for an efficient corporate governance system in China are discussed. The analysis is focused on the Chinese state – owned enterprises (SOEs) and township and village enterprises (TVEs). The first section of the paper seeks to review the essence of the principal – agent problem. The second section explains the ‘success story’ of the Chinese TVEs. The final part of the paper assesses the efficiency of SOE corporate governance mechanisms in China.

Keywords: corporate governance; China; principal-agent theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P31 P52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:73625

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