Specialization, Matching Intensity and Income Inequality of Sellers
Konstantinos Eleftheriou () and
Michael Polemis ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We develop a simple model with heterogeneous agents and search frictions to study how increases in matching intensity between buyers and sellers determine the level of income inequality among sellers. Our findings indicate that a reduction in search frictions leads to higher inequality and induces buyers to purchase goods and services only from specialized sellers.
Keywords: game theory; income inequality; matching; technology; value functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:74579
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