Why Don't Democracies go to War?

Charles Coleman ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Cost-benefit analysis is applied to the choice of whether to go to war. The polar cases of autocracies and democracy are considered. Offensive and defensive wars are distinguished. Democracies are less likely to go to war.

Keywords: war; rent-seeking; democracy; autocracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:74742

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