Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Amitrajeet Batabyal and
Seung Jick Yoo
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
In this note we study a simple game model of effort application by two individuals (1 and 2) who wish to have an arranged marriage. We first specify the net utility function of individual i as a function of this individual’s own effort and the effort applied by individual j,i≠j, in three distinct cases. Next, we compute the ith individual’s best response function. Finally, we analyze effort application by two identical pairs of individuals who are located in two different nations. In the first (second) nation, arranged marriages are uncommon (common) and hence it is relatively difficult (straightforward) for the two individuals to apply and coordinate effort. We explain why the net utility of the pair wishing to have an arranged marriage in the first nation is likely to be much lower than the corresponding net utility of the pair in the second nation.
Keywords: Arranged Marriage; Effort; Net Utility; Static Game; Strategic Complements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:74745
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