Characterizing Pure-strategy Equilibria in Large Games

Haifeng Fu, Ying Xu and Luyi Zhang

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we divide the players of a large game into countable different groups and assume that each player’s payoff depends on her own action and the distribution of actions in each of the subgroups. Focusing on the interaction between Nash equilibria and the best response correspondence of the players, we characterize the pure-strategy equilibria in three settings of such large games, namely large games with countable actions, large games with countable homogeneous groups of players and large games with an atomless Loeb agent space. Furthermore, we also present a counterexample showing that a similar characterization result does not hold for large games under a more general setting.

Keywords: Large games; Pure strategy equilibrium; Characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7514/2/MPRA_paper_7514.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8025/2/MPRA_paper_8025.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:7514

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().