Defaults en carteras hipotecarias, macroeconomía y arreglos institucionales: Más allá de los modelos de Credit-Scoring tradicionales
Mortgage defaults, macroeconomics, and institutional arrangements: Beyond the standard Credit Scoring
David Mermelstein
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
This paper explores determinants of mortgage default, enlightening the transmission mechanisms between the economic cycle, institutional arrangements and the microeconomic event of individual default. It revises the scope and limitations of standard credit-scoring models, that is those generic classification models used by banks to discriminate good from bad debtors. Starting from a microeconomic model of mortgage default, it is shown that there will be some level of strategic defaults, even in a hypothetical world in which standard Credit-Scoring models work perfectly. That means a specification error in standard models, which only capture the solvency-tied fundamentals of repayment, but no the strategic ones triggered by macroeconomic and institutional factors. Some alternative methods and policy measures are suggested.
Keywords: mortgage default; credit scoring; credit markets; institutional arrangements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:7535
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