Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders

Toshihiro Matsumura and Atsushi Yamagishi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate a free-entry market in which incumbents engage in lobbying for changing regulations, which affect the cost of all firms equally. We find that incumbents have incentive to weaken or strengthen regulations, depending on the demand condition.

Keywords: lobbying; common costs; free entry market; Stackelberg; regulation costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75624/1/MPRA_paper_75624.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:75624

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