Long-Run Welfare Effect of Energy Conservation Regulation

Toshihiro Matsumura and Atsushi Yamagishi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate the long-run effect of energy conservation regulation, which forces firms to raise energy-saving investment above the cost-minimising level (i.e. the business-as-usual level). If Pigovian tax is imposed, additional regulation always harms social welfare under perfect competition. However, under imperfect competition, additional regulation can improve welfare even if Pigovian tax is imposed. Thus, under imperfect competition, there is a rationale for additional energy conservation regulation even in the presence of Pigovian tax. Our result under imperfect competition holds regardless of whether strategies are strategic substitutes or complements in contrast to direct entry regulation.

Keywords: energy-saving; environmental tax; free entry market; consumer-benefiting regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 H54 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75626/1/MPRA_paper_75626.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Long-run welfare effect of energy conservation regulation (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:75626

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().