Структурирование рынков – инструмент государственной промышленной политики

Market structuring as an instrument of the state industrial policy implementation

Georgiy Kolesnik and Nicolay Shvets

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: One of the instruments of market competition regulation is the formation of a hierarchical structure of producers by providing some of them with the preferential terms of business. In addition to the changes in market prices, the sale of privileges to producers allows consumer to extract some extra income. The authors study the impact of the privileges in the form of long-term agreements on the market equilibrium and consumer surplus. It is shown that long-term agreements are effective for a consumer at the markets with а small number of participants. The influence of transaction costs on the optimal market contracting structure is analyzed.

Keywords: competition; market; privileges; welfare; hierarchical system; regulation; industrial policy; procurement activity; long-term agreement; import substitution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D47 L13 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-03
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Published in Экономика и математические методы 4.51(2015): pp. 85-95

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Journal Article: Структурирование рынков - инструмент государственной промышленной политики (2015)
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