Cheating on Your Spouse: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Amitrajeet Batabyal and
Hamid Beladi
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
In this note we analyze a game model of marital infidelity. The husband can either be faithful to or cheat on his wife. The wife can either monitor or not monitor her husband. We first determine the best response correspondences of the two players. Second, we explain why there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game under study. Third, we show that there exists a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game. Finally, we demonstrate the nexus between our marital infidelity game and the prominent Matching Pennies game.
Keywords: Cheating; Faithfulness; Monitoring; Mixed-Strategy; Static Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:75758
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