Разграничение полномочий между федеральным и региональным уровнями власти в области налоговых льгот. Фискальные последствия

The differentiation of the authority in tax incentives among the federal and regional levels: Fiscal implications

Milyausha Pinskaya and Georgiy Kolesnik

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The authors study the problems of differentiation in the authority levels to establish tax incentives among the federal and regional government bodies and assess the corresponding negative impact on the tax competition. It is shown that the federal intervention in the regional tax privileges may lead to a distortion of vertical tax competition, a shortfall in tax revenues in the regional budgets, as well as to the migration of the tax base between regions, thereby distorting the real picture of the profits allocation. The obtained results can be used by federal and regional public authorities for developing the proposals to improve mechanisms of tax privileges provision and interbudgetary transfers’ optimization.

Keywords: tax power; tax privilege; tax competition; interbudgetary relations; federative system; vertical tax effect; consolidated group of taxpayers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 H32 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis
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Published in Экономика и математические методы 3.52(2016): pp. 22-35

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Journal Article: Разграничение полномочий между федеральным и региональным уровнями власти в области налоговых льгот: фискальные последствия (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:75805

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