Economics at your fingertips  

Nash equilibrium with discontinuous utility functions: Reny's approach extended

Nikolai Kukushkin ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Philip Reny's approach to games with discontinuous utility functions can work outside its original context. The existence of Nash equilibrium, as well as the possibility to approach an equilibrium with a finite individual improvement path, are established, under a condition slightly weaker than the better reply security, for three classes of strategic games: potential games, games with strategic complementarities, and aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity conditions.

Keywords: better reply security; Nash equilibrium; potential game; game with strategic complementarities; aggregative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc

Downloads: (external link) original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

Page updated 2024-03-31
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:75862