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Does corporate governance matter in fund management company: the case of china

Emmanuel Mamatzakis and Bingrun Xu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study investigates the effectiveness of the contractual governance of Chinese fund management companies by using comprehensive governance data over the period from 2005 to 2015. The study finds that board size a negative impact on its performance and market share. The findings are consistent with the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis. This paper also finds a positive association between the percentage of independent directors and market share and a negative correlation between the percentage of independent directors and the expense ratio. Moreover, a fund management company with a higher level of managerial ownership and a higher proportion of institutional investors results in more effective fund governance; however, a larger institutional investor holding may lead to a higher expense ratio.

Keywords: Contractual governance; governance effectiveness; board size; board structure; managerial ownership; institutional investors’ holding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 G23 G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-cna, nep-cta and nep-tra
Date: 2017-01-11
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