The Use of Quantitative Economic Techniques in EU Merger Control

Thomas Buettner, Giulio Federico and Szabolcs Lorincz ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In some recent merger cases the European Commission has relied on quantitative economic techniques in the competitive assessment of horizontal mergers. These techniques have ranged from the use of merger simulation models (for both differentiated and homogenous goods), to the deployment of direct estimation methods to study the effects of relevant events in the past. This article describes the appropriate use of these quantitative techniques, and it explains the rationale for the reliance on these methods. It also explains why the evidence from economic modelling is complementary to more traditional qualitative evidence on the expected impact of horizontal mergers.

Keywords: European Commission; merger control; quantitative methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 C63 L13 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-eur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Antitrust Magazine 1.31(2016): pp. 68-75

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:76384

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