A Game Model of Optimal Apartment Cleaning by College Students

Amitrajeet Batabyal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this note we use a static game model to analyze the optimal cleanup of an apartment that is shared by two college students. Both students dislike cleaning. However, they also prefer a clean apartment to a dirty one. Student i's utility function embodies the idea that the more time one student spends cleaning, the less valuable is the time spent cleaning by the other student. In this setting, we first determine the best response function of each student (player) i where i=1,2. Second, we determine the cleaning time choices that survive one round of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS). Finally, we ascertain the cleaning time choices that survive all rounds of IESDS.

Keywords: Apartment; Cleanup; College Student; Static Game; Strictly Dominated Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76663/1/MPRA_paper_76663.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:76663

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().