Soft Commitments, Reminders and Academic Performance
Oliver Himmler (),
Robert Jaeckle and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Robert Jäckle ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
A large share of students in higher education graduates with delay or fails to obtain a degree at all. In our field experiment, students can sign a non-binding agreement and self-commit to staying on track for graduation. We provide first evidence that soft commitment devices can enhance educational progress and -- more generally -- improve the completion of complex tasks such as passing exams. A pure reminder treatment does not change behavior, suggesting that the effects are not driven by increased salience. As predicted by a simple decision model, we show that procrastinators benefit most from the soft commitment device.
Keywords: Commitment Device; Reminder; Procrastination; Education; Field Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D03 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-edu and nep-exp
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Journal Article: Soft Commitments, Reminders, and Academic Performance (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:76832
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