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Moralizing Gods and Armed Conflict

Ahmed Skali ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study documents a robust empirical pattern between moralizing gods, which prescribe fixed laws of morality, and conflict prevalence and fatalities, using spatially referenced data for Africa on contemporary conflicts and ancestral belief systems of individual ethnic groups prior to European contact. Moralizing gods are found to significantly increase conflict prevalence and casualties at the local level. The identification strategy draws on the evolutionary psychology roots of moralizing gods as a solution to the collective action problem in pre-modern societies. A one standard deviation increase in the likelihood of emergence of a moralizing god increases casualties by 18 to 36% and conflict prevalence by 4 to 8% approximately.

Keywords: Conflict; Commitment Problem; Religion; Africa; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 O55 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-evo
Date: 2017-01-28
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