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Commuting and internet traffic congestion

Marcus Berliant ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We examine the fine microstructure of commuting in a game-theoretic setting with a continuum of commuters. Commuters' home and work locations can be heterogeneous. A commuter transport network is exogenous. Traffic speed is determined by link capacity and by local congestion at a time and place along a link, where local congestion at a time and place is endogenous. The model can be reinterpreted to apply to congestion on the internet. We find sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium, that multiple equilibria are ubiquitous, and that the welfare properties of morning and evening commute equilibria differ.

Keywords: Commuting; Congestion externality; Efficient Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L86 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ict, nep-reg, nep-tre and nep-ure
Date: 2017-03-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:77378

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