The impact of rule of laws on the recovery of distressed PPP infrastructure Projects

Nakhon Kokkaew, Carlos Cruz () and Derek Alexander

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: As Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) around the world gain in popularity as a way to finance needed infrastructure, careful study prior to implementing PPP infrastructure projects becomes more important to avoid distress and cancellation in later stages. Unlike traditional infrastructure projects delivered using public finance, PPP projects usually have complex capital structures and multi-party operational control. These parties typically have differing, even diverging goals, which may conflict when faced with operating difficulty. The sponsors of those distressed PPP projects must then renegotiate their contracts with the host government and lenders if the project is to continue operating. This renegotiation occurs in the shadow of local law concerning security interests, contract rights, insolvency and bankruptcy, as parties calibrate their positions to potential downside outcomes. This paper examines the impact of such laws on the distressed PPP infrastructure projects in Thailand. The paper focuses the study on two main contracts commonly found in PPP projects: one between the sponsors and the host government, and the other between the sponsors and the secured lenders.

Keywords: KEYWORDS: distressed PPP projects; PPP laws and regulations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G38 H54 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-ppm, nep-sea and nep-tre
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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