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Modeling the „Visitors to Rome“ effect: Reputation Building in Anglo-Saxon Buyout Funds in Japan

Georg Blind and Lottanti von Mandach Stefania

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Stereotypes pose a major challenge to agents entering a foreign market. In order to overcome these stereotypes, visitor agents may decide to emulate domestic behavior. We develop a simple model of reputation building in transactions where identities are revealed and show that this tendency may even imply over-assimilation if stereotypes are sticky and assimilation efforts are not overly costly. The model predictions are tested using data on private equity-led buyout transactions in Japan from 1998 to 2015. While early transactions by Anglo-Saxon investors display marked differences, there is a strong tendency toward approximation of domestic standards, which eventually leads to over-compensation.

Keywords: Reputation building; stereotypes; strategically revealed preferences; buyout investments; heterogeneous preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 F65 G02 G23 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01-31
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Journal Article: Of pride and prejudice: agent learning under sticky and persistent stereotype (2021) Downloads
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