Optimal Apartment Cleaning by Harried College Students: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Amitrajeet Batabyal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this note we use a simple game model to analyze the optimal cleanup of an apartment that is shared by n ∈ ℕ college students who are pressed for time. From an individual standpoint, these students dislike cleaning. However, they also prefer a clean apartment to a dirty one. Hence, for any student i, where i=1,...,n, this student’s utility is the total number of hours spent by all the n students cleaning less a number d times the hours spent cleaning by himself. In this setting, we first determine the Nash equilibrium cleanup times when the number d is less than unity. Second, we find the Nash equilibrium cleanup times when d is greater than unity. Finally, for specific values of n and d, we investigate whether the second Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient.

Keywords: Apartment; Cleanup; College Student; Nash Equilibrium; Static Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06-12, Revised 2017-06-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:79887

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