Patterns of Rebellion: A Model with Three Challengers
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This study proposes a dynamic model of rebellion, where three players individually decide to challenge their common adversary. It is formally demonstrated that the pattern of rebellion is determined endogenously, depending on the challengers' resolve and strength. In other words, a stronger challenger with more resolve tends to fight earlier than others do.
Keywords: bandwagoning; strategic coordination; rebellion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:80034
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