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Patterns of Rebellion: A Model with Three Challengers

Keisuke Nakao

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study proposes a dynamic model of rebellion, where three players individually decide to challenge their common adversary. It is formally demonstrated that the pattern of rebellion is determined endogenously, depending on the challengers' resolve and strength. In other words, a stronger challenger with more resolve tends to fight earlier than others do.

Keywords: bandwagoning; strategic coordination; rebellion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2017-07-04
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