Spatial non-price competition in port infrastructure services
Ramón Núñez-Sánchez and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This study analyses the possible existence of spatial non-price competition in the port industry. We propose a dynamic two-stage model that allows: (1) to estimate the sensitivity of generation and diversion of traffic caused by port capacity expansions; (2) to quantify the degree of capacity competition; (3) to simulate a hypothetical scenario of cooperation agreements among different port authorities. The econometric specification is based on a structural model of demand, cost and market equilibrium. The empirical results suggest that non-price competition exists in port infrastructure services. Furthermore, using a simulation analysis, we show that incentives to invest in port capacity decrease under a cooperative setting.
Keywords: Strategic interdepence; imperfect competition; port capacity; port alliances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 D4 L1 L9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-reg, nep-tre and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:80417
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