Profitable and desirable corporate environmentalism in a delegation contract under incentive subsidy on abatement technologies

Sang-Ho Lee and Chul-Hi Park ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study investigates corporate environmentalism in a managerial delegation contract and shows that a well-designed subsidy scheme can enhance business profitability and thus, an environmental policy could lead to both social and private benefits. This analysis allows us to better understand the Porter’s concept of environmental policy and firm’s profitability.

Keywords: corporate environmentalism; environmental corporate social responsibility; managerial delegation contract; incentive subsidy scheme; Porter’s hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L21 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta and nep-env
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:81091

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