Average Pay in Banks: Do Agency Problems and Bank Performance Matter?
Sean M. Harkin,
Davide Salvatore Mare () and
Jonathan N. Crook
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We study the determinants of average pay across all levels of staff seniority for UK banks between 2003 and 2012. We show that pay is affected by agency problems but not by bank operating performance. Average pay does not depend on accounting outcomes at the bank level. By contrast, average pay is positively affected by the presence of a Remuneration Committee and the proportion of Non-Executives on the Board. These findings indicate that bank pay is determined by agency issues, not bank accounting performance. Our results have practical implications for bank shareholders and regulators, suggesting the need for greater transparency in governance of bank pay.
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Remuneration; Bank Performance; Agency Problems. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G34 G35 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cdm, nep-eff, nep-eur and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81249/1/MPRA_paper_81249.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Average pay in banks: do agency problems and bank performance matter? (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:81249
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().