On Single-peaked Domains and Min-max Rules

Gopakumar Achuthankutty () and Souvik Roy ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider social choice problems where different agents can have different sets of admissible single-peaked preferences. We show every unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function on such domains satisfies Pareto property and tops-onlyness. Further, we characterize all domains on which (i) every unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function is a min-max rule, and (ii) every min-max rule is strategy-proof. As an application of our result, we obtain a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice functions on maximal single-peaked domains (Moulin (1980), Weymark (2011)), minimally rich single-peaked domains (Peters et al. (2014)), maximal regular single-crossing domains (Saporiti (2009), Saporiti (2014)), and distance based single-peaked domains.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; single-peaked preferences; min-max rules; min-max domains; top-connectedness; Pareto property; tops-onlyness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On single-peaked domains and min–max rules (2018)
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