Adversarial scheduling analysis of Game-Theoretic Models of Norm Diffusion

Gabriel Istrate, Madhav V. Marathe and S.S. Ravi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In (Istrate et al. SODA 2001) we advocated the investigation of robustness of results in the theory of learning in games under adversarial scheduling models. We provide evidence that such an analysis is feasible and can lead to nontrivial results by investigating, in an adversarial scheduling setting, Peyton Young's model of diffusion of norms . In particular, our main result incorporates contagion into Peyton Young's model.

Keywords: evolutionary games; stochastic stability; adversarial scheduling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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Forthcoming in Proceedings of the Fourth Computability in Europe (CIE'2008) Conference Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 5028 (to appear) (2008): pp. 1-15

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