R&D Output Sharing in a Mixed Duopoly and Incentive Subsidy Policy

Sang-Ho Lee and Timur Muminov

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study investigates the incentives for R&D output sharing in a mixed duopoly and shows that public firm chooses full sharing of their R&D output, whereas private firm enjoys free-riding. We then devise an agreement-based incentive R&D subsidy scheme, which can internalize R&D spillovers and induce both firms to earn higher payoffs through full sharing of their R&D output. We also show that an R&D subsidy policy is welfare-superior to a production subsidy policy.

Keywords: Agreement-based R&D subsidy; Mixed duopoly; Production output subsidy; R&D output sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 L13 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-reg and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:81732

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