Codetermination: the Necessary Presence of Workers on the Board. A Mathematical Model

Donato Forcillo ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyse in a firm the possible choice between two systems of corporate governance: the one-tier board, a structure commonly used in the Anglo-American world, and the system of Codetermination, a two-tier board with the presence of workers' representatives in the supervisory board, a model commonly adopted by firms in Germany. The aim is to fill a gap present in the current literature, the absence of a mathematical model that explains how works the governance's system of Codetermination presents not only in the German world, but expanding in many other European countries, as a result of the recent EU directives, which emphasize the need to involve workers in company decisions.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Codetermination; Labor Representation; Workers; Human Capital; Single Board; One-Tier Board; Monitoring; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cfn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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