English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

Juan Dubra (dubraj@um.edu.uy), Federico Echenique and Alejandro Manelli

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.

Keywords: English auctions; Stolper-Samuelson; single crossing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 D44 F11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:8218

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