Strategy-proof Rules on Partially Single-peaked Domains

Gopakumar Achuthankutty () and Souvik Roy ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider domains that exhibit single-peakedness only over a subset of alternatives. We call such domains partially single-peaked and provide a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice functions on these domains. As an application of this result, we obtain a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice functions on multi-peaked domains (Stiglitz (1974), Shepsle (1979), Epple and Romano (1996a)), single-peaked domains with respect to a partial order (Chatterji and Massó (2015)), multiple single-peaked domains (Reffgen (2015)) and single-peaked domains on graphs (Schummer and Vohra (2002)). As a by-product of our results, it follows that strategy-proofness implies tops-onlyness on these domains. Further, we show that strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness are equivalent on these domains.

Keywords: Partially single-peaked domain; strategy-proofness; group strategy-proofness; partly dictatorial min-max rules. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy-proof rules on partially single-peaked domains (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:82267

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