Employee Poaching: Why It Can Be Predatory

Jin-Hyuk Kim ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: There is a growing concern over predatory hiring practices that are aimed at eliminating competitors. Using a duopoly model in which firm's profits depend on the quality of the worker-employer match, this paper studies the conditions under which predatory equilibrium exists. I find that predatory hiring can occur when the match between the worker and the new employer is relatively poor and the old employer has a shallow pool of replacement candidates. Post-employment lawsuits do not affect the range of predatory equilibrium if the parties take into account expected damages payment.

Keywords: employee poaching; predatory hiring; raising rivals' costs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J62 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-05
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Published in Managerial and Decision Economics 35.5(2014): pp. 309-317

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:82377

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