Matrix representation of TU-games for Linear Efficient and Symmetric values

Miamo Clovis

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The aim of this article is to present a new tool for assessing TU-game based on a matrix representation. We focus on TU-games with coalition structures and provide a general matrix form of TU-game. We shed light on some useful properties of the matrix representation of TU-game and the general form obtained is applied to describe the representation for some classical TU-game. The facilities provided by such a representation are used to characterize subclasses of Linear Efficient and Symmetric (LES) values.

Keywords: Cooperative games; Matrix; LES value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C69 C71 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83757/1/MPRA_paper_82416.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:82416

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