European qualifiers to the 2018 FIFA World Cup can be manipulated
László Csató ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Tournament organizers supposedly design rules such that a team cannot be better off by exerting a lower effort. It is shown that the European qualifiers to the 2018 FIFA World Cup are not strategy-proof in this sense: a team might be eliminated if it wins in the last matchday of group stage, while it advances to play-offs by playing a draw, provided that all other results do not change. An example reveals that this scenario could have happened in October 2017, after four-fifth of all matches have already been played. We present a model and identify nine incentive incompatible qualifiers to recent UEFA European Championships or FIFA World Cups. A mechanism is suggested in order to seal the way of manipulation in group-based qualification systems.
Keywords: OR in sport; 2018 FIFA World Cup; tournament ranking; mechanism design; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82652/1/MPRA_paper_82652.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83437/1/MPRA_paper_83437.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:82652
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().