Cascading Defections from Cooperation Triggered by Present-Biased Behaviors in the Commons
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This work shows that defective behaviors from the cooperative equilibrium in the management of common resources can be fueled and triggered by the presence of agents with myopic behaviors; a similar phenomenon is also possible with cooperative motivations. This paper demonstrates and discusses that the apparent and detectable decay of the cooperative choices in the dilemmas of common resources are not an exclusive and indisputable signal of an escalation in free-riding intentions, but can also be an outcome of the present-biased preferences and myopic behaviors of the cooperative agents. In fact, within the context populated by conditional cooperators with a heterogeneous myopic discount factor, in the absence of information about agents’ intentions, the present-biased preferences can trigger a strategy that directs the community to excessively increase its harvesting level, even in presence of the other-regarding motives. The behavior implemented by naïve agents, even if done with cooperative intent, can activate a dynamic of cascading defections from the cooperative strategy within the harvester group. Therefore, a lowering of the cooperative behaviors can also be the effect of the absence of coordination instruments in response to the cognitive bias that influences human behaviors.
Keywords: Present bias; Commons; Cooperation; Cascading Defections; Naïve Agent. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 D03 D90 Q20 Q29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2016-07-20, Revised 2017-11-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83131/8/MPRA_paper_83131.pdf original version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:83131
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Joachim Winter ().