Employee Poaching, Predatory Hiring, and Covenants Not to Compete

Jin-Hyuk Kim ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Poaching key employees from close competitors has become a prevalent and controversial issue. This paper examines the condition under which employee poaching can be either predatory or competitive, and discusses its implications for the enforcement of post-employment non-compete agreements. When poaching sufficiently injures the entrant’s ability to compete, predatory hiring can occur in the sense that the incumbent would have been unprofitable in the absence of the entrant’s exit. Some antitrust implications are discussed.

Keywords: employee poaching; non-compete covenants; predation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J63 J68 K31 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:83254

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