Economics at your fingertips  

Tournaments with subsequent group stages are incentive incompatible

László Csató ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We discuss the strategy-proofness of multistage tournaments. In a tournament with subsequent group stages, players are divided into groups in the preliminary and main rounds, where they play pairwise matches against each other. The higher ranked players qualify to the next stage such that matches are not repeated in the main round if two qualified players have already faced in the preliminary round. Players prefer to carry over better results to the main round, provided that they qualify. It is shown that these tournament systems, widely used in handball, are incentive incompatible. We also present some historical examples where a team was ex ante not interested in winning by a high margin.

Keywords: OR in sport; tournament ranking; handball; strategy-proofness; manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 D71 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-spo
Date: 2017-12-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

Page updated 2019-07-12
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:83269