Endogenous Private Leadership under Subsidy Policy on the Social Enterprises

Sumi Cho and Sang-Ho Lee

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate a mixed oligopoly model in which private enterprises compete with social enterprises under government subsidy policy, and examine the endogenous choice of private leadership. We show that private leadership is socially desirable, but the numbers of private and social enterprises affect endogenous choices and welfare consequences. We also show that the role of government in choosing the optimal subsidy will be significant when there are more than one private enterprises but its number is smaller than that of the social enterprises.

Keywords: Social Enterprise; Private Enterprise; Private Leadership; Private Followership; Subsidization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 H23 L13 L22 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:83431

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