Land Acquisition and Compensation Policy for Development Activity

Soumyananda Dinda ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Development policy focuses on creation of economic opportunities which increase the demand for transferring land from primary to secondary or tertiary activities. Market mechanism is sufficient argument of distributive justice for land acquisition for development activities, but it ignores income security. Landowners are heterogeneous in terms of knowledge, skills, risk preferences, attitudes and perception of future development benefits. The role of complementarities of land with farming skills are non-transferable that incorporate their concern for financial security and time preference. These concerns exhibited considerable diversity with corresponding preferences over alternative forms of non-cash compensation. Hence, alternative compensation packages ought to be offered to cater to this diversity.

Keywords: Land acquisition; compensation policy; income security; risk preference; valuation; market price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H7 K0 K1 Q15 Z1 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08-16, Revised 2016-01-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Land and Rural Studies 4.1(2016): pp. 111-118

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Related works:
Working Paper: Land Acquisition and Compensation Policy for Development Activity (2015)
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