The timing of environmental policies with excess burden of taxation in free-entry mixed markets
Lili Xu and
Sang-Ho Lee ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This study investigates the timing of environmental policies in free-entry mixed markets with excess burden of taxation. We consider two scenarios in which the government chooses the optimal tax before or after firms enter the market, and compare these ex-ante and ex-post taxations. When the excess burden of taxation is small (large), we find that ex-post taxation imposes a lower (higher) tax level than ex-ante taxation, which induces a larger (smaller) number of firms and a higher (lower) environmental damage. Finally, the effect of excess burden of taxation can increase the welfare, but ex-ante taxation always yields higher welfare than ex-post taxation.
Keywords: Environmental policy; Ex-ante taxation; Ex-post taxation; Free entry; Mixed oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H25 L13 L32 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83560/1/MPRA_paper_83560.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/85733/1/MPRA_paper_83560.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:83560
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().