Cryptocurrency Voting Games

Sanjay Bhattacherjee and Palash Sarkar

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This work shows that weighted majority voting games occur in cryptocurrencies. In particular, two such games are highlighted. The first game, which we call the Rule Game, pertains to the scenario where the entities in the system engage in a voting procedure to accept or reject a change of rules. The second game, which we call the Attack Game, refers to the scenario where a group of entities in a cryptocurrency system can form a coalition to engage in double spending. For the Rule Game we provide analysis to argue that the Coleman’s preventive power measure is the appropriate tool for measuring a player’s influence in the game while for the Attack Game, we define a notion of stability based on the notion of minimal winning coalitions. For both the Rule Game and the Attack Game, we show how to analyse the games based on a snapshot of real world data for Bitcoin which is presently the most popular of all the cryptocurrencies.

Keywords: Voting games; Cryptocurrency; Bitcoin; preventive power; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C15 C71 D72 D74 Y10 Y20 Y80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-pay
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:83592

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