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Positive and negative effects analysis in abuse of dominance

Mihai Marginean

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Abuse of a dominant position is a threat to the functioning of the free market. This is the reason why we have proposed to highlight the impact of this particular anti-competitive practice in the European Union area. The aim of this paper is to present, from a theoretical and practical approach, the implications and the effects of this type of behavior and also to highlight the main actors in this process. In order to achieve these goals, we will use the content analysis to compress the effects of the abuse of dominant position in two categories: positive and negative effects. The historical method to emphasize the historical origins of the concepts and institutions involved. The comparative method will be used to nominate specific features, concepts or institutions that we will analyze and also it will help us to analyze the evolution that have occurred over time in terms of their development and to highlight certain advantages or disadvantages in terms of choice of competition policy on the abuse of a dominant position. In this paper we will notice that both the companies and the market itself are facing with companies that use anti-competitive since 1900. These kind of practices are harmful both for competition and for consumers, so that should not be allowed to expand. In this context, the European Commission imposed a set of rules that all operators must comply in order to protect, maintain and stimulate competition in the Single Market and to promote fair competition.

Keywords: competition; anticompetitive policy; abuse of dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 G39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-law
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