A Note on Stable Cartels

Liang Mao

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In non-cooperative open membership cartel formation games, it is usually assumed that cartel members will maximize their joint payoffs. Through an example, this note shows that this assumption is problematic, because it imposes some unnecessary restrictions on cartel members' actions. We recommend that the cartel agreement should be endogenously determined in future studies.

Keywords: cartel formation; stable cartel; self-enforcing agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-14, Revised 2018-01-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com and nep-gth
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/86247/1/MPRA_paper_86247.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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