The Effect of Inequality Aversion on a Climate Coalition Formation: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Yu-Hsuan Lin

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This chapter examines the impact of inequality-averse attitudes on the individual incentives of participating in international environmental agreements by a laboratory experiment. The experimental result shows that the inequality-averse attitudes have significantly positive impact on the incentives of participation. Particularly, when they are non-critical players, egalitarians are likely to give up the free riding benefit by joining a coalition. It helps us to understand the coalition formation in the international conventions.

Keywords: Social preference; experimental design; international environmental agreement; inequality aversion; heterogeneous countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D71 Q01 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-ict and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economics of International Environmental Agreements: A Critical Approach (2017): pp. 61-76

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:84097

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