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Autocratic Rule and Social Capital: Evidence from Imperial China

Melanie Meng Xue and Mark Koyama ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper explores the impact of autocratic rule on social capital—defined as the beliefs, attitudes, norms and perceptions that support cooperation. Political repression is a distinguishing characteristic of autocratic regimes. Between 1660–1788, individuals in imperial China were persecuted if they were suspected of holding subversive attitudes towards the state. A difference-in-differences approach suggests that in an average prefecture, exposure to those literary inquisitions led to a decline of 38% in local charities—a key proxy of social capital. Consistent with the historical panel results, we find that in affected prefectures, individuals have lower levels of generalized trust in modern China. Taking advantage of institutional variation in 20th c. China, and two instrumental variables, we provide further evidence that political repression permanently reduced social capital. Furthermore, we find that individuals in prefectures with a legacy of literary inquisitions ar are more politically apathetic. These results indicate a potential vicious cycle in which autocratic rule becomes self-reinforcing through causing a permanent decline in social capital.

Keywords: Social Capital; Institutions; Autocracy; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D73 N45 Z1 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-his, nep-pol and nep-soc
Date: 2018-01-25
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