Stackelberg equilibrium in duopoly: strategic use of corporate social responsibility

Ajay Sharma

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that in a duopoly model with firms being concerned about profit as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR), the outcome of game may coincide with the Stackelberg outcome. We argue that owner of the firm may use CSR orientation as a strategy to become Stackelberg leader in the quantity competition game.

Keywords: Stackelberg outcome; Corporate social responsibility; Cournot game; Duopoly; Non-profit orientation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 L10 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mkt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:84326

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